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In regulating the voluntary interruption of pregnancy,
English law has accorded particular significance to two
biological events. First, ‘viability’, the moment when a
fetus is said to acquire the capacity for independent life,
plays an important role in grounding restrictions on
access to legal abortion later in pregnancy. Second,
equally significantly but far less frequently discussed,
‘implantation’ marks the point in pregnancy from which
abortion laws apply. This paper focuses on this earlier
biological event. It suggests that an unquestioning
reliance on implantation as marking an appropriate
moment of transition between two radically different
legal frameworks is deeply problematic and is rendered
still less sustainable in the light of the development of
new technologies that potentially operate shortly after
the moment of implantation.
INTRODUCTION
Scientists have suggested that the development of
‘contragestive’ technologies (which operate in the
early weeks after intercourse, at the borderline
between contraception and abortion) is technically
possible and might offer significant new means of
fertility control, which have clear advantages for
some women.1 However, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to make these new technologies
available within England. This is not as a result of
modern, democratic deliberation of the ethical and
clinical merits and risks of such treatments but is
rather an unconsidered consequence of archaic
legislation, framed at a time when they were
unimaginable. This legislation offers a ‘regulatory
cliff edge’ between methods of fertility control that
operate before implantation and those that operate
after it. In this paper, I argue that this status quo is
morally indefensible. I begin with a brief discussion
of biology and the relevant law, before moving on
to assess the implications of new technologies and
the moral significance of implantation. While I
focus on English law, the broad issues raised are
also relevant to many other countries that take
implantation as marking a legal boundary between
contraception and abortion.
SEAMLESS BIOLOGY AND LEGAL BRIGHT LINES
As Glanville Williams once said ‘[a]bstract human
life does not ‘begin’; it just keeps going’.2 A seam-
less biological continuum exists through the pro-
duction of sperm and egg, their joining together in
a process of fertilisation, the gradual development
of the new entity thus created throughout preg-
nancy, birth, subsequent growth, eventual death
and ensuing decay of the body. Defining what
happens along the way as an ‘embryo’, ‘fetus’,
‘person’, ‘adult’, or ‘corpse’ requires an attempt to
draw bright lines on the basis of criteria selected as
holding significance for legal or other purposes.
The drawing of such lines is challenging and not
only because the selection of the relevant criteria
will inevitably be contested. Also, the issue of when
each of these various statuses is achieved is compli-
cated because any characteristics on which they rely
are liable to develop at a different number of
hours, days, weeks or years in different organisms.
Further, the characteristics may appear or be lost
gradually over time. Implantation, for example,
involves the fertilised egg physically attaching itself
to the wall of the womb some 6–12 days after ovu-
lation.3 It occurs as a process that occurs in a
number of distinct stages, including apposition
(where the blastocyst orients itself correctly), the
shedding of the zona pellucida, adhesion (an
attachment to the endometrial surface) and inva-
sion and embedding (its further establishment).4
Implantation is, in many countries, taken to rep-
resent the dividing line between abortion and
contraception, with these two practices generally
treated as if they are readily distinguishable and
appropriately subject to very different regulation.
While the need for some elements of prescription-
only status and pharmacist control has at times
been contested, the regulation of contraceptives in
Britain primarily reflects health considerations,
imposing varying levels of control that reflect the
risks of side effects and the technical complexity of
the method used.5 6 Thus, condoms are freely
available for purchase in shops, the combined pill is
available on prescription only and the morning-
after pill is available over the counter from a
pharmacist. This framework stands in stark contrast
to the morally grounded criminal prohibitions that
establish the parameters within which abortion ser-
vices may be legally offered. While also said to be
informed by a concern for women’s health, it is
generally accepted that this latter framework aims
to limit or to condemn the intentional destruction
of fetal life.7 8 Thus, the Offences Against the
Person Act 1861 provides for a potential sentence
of life imprisonment for any unlawful ‘procure-
ment of miscarriage’, from the moment that a preg-
nancy is established through implantation, and a
5 year prison sentence for the unlawful supply or
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procurement of any poison, other ‘noxious thing’ or instrument
for that purpose.9 Intentional disruption of a pregnancy will
thenceforth be lawful only where offered in line with the thera-
peutic exception carved out by the Abortion Act 1967 which, in
all but emergency circumstances, requires that a termination is
authorised by two doctors and performed by a doctor on
approved premises.10
With the key phrase of ‘procurement of miscarriage’ left
undefined in the 1861 Act, it has fallen to the courts to clarify
its meaning and, thus, to decide from which moment in the bio-
logical process the Act should apply. In a lengthy and erudite
judgement in the case of Smeaton, Munby J (as he then was)
confirmed that the morning-after pill, which operates post fertil-
isation but prior to implantation, was a contraceptive rather
than an abortifacient.i The judge reasoned that the offence of
‘unlawful procurement of miscarriage’ presupposes some prior
‘carriage’ that involves ‘not merely presence in the woman’s
body and interaction with it, but attachment to it in a real sense
such as occurs only with implantation’ (para 353).11 This
ruling, reflecting modern medical understandings of the term
‘miscarriage’, allowed the Court to avoid the ‘unattractive’ pos-
sibility that ‘a judge in 2002 were to be compelled by a statute
141 years old to hold that what thousands, hundreds of thou-
sands, indeed millions, of ordinary honest, decent, law abiding
citizens have been doing day in day out for so many years is and
always has been criminal’ (para 394).11 While achieving a prac-
tical, workable outcome for the morning-after pill, however,
drawing a bright line at the moment of implantation offers a far
from satisfactory basis for the future development of techniques
of fertility control that operate in early pregnancy. Further, the
regulatory ‘cliff edge’ between abortion and contraception is
likely to gain greater significance in the future, raising issues that
can only be resolved by statutory reform.
IMPLANTATION AND CONTRAGESTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Researchers are currently exploring the potential to develop
new ‘contragestive’ drugs that operate around the time of
implantation, including some treatments that might operate
either before or after it has occurred. The legal issues raised by
such potential regimens are not entirely new. In the 1970s,
a doctor reported that he offered menstrual regulation within
10–18 days of a missed period, without first confirming whether
a woman was pregnant.12 Where offered post implantation, it
was accepted that this practice was caught by the criminal pro-
hibition contained in the 1861 Act, with opinion divided
regarding whether it might be rendered lawful even where
attempts were made to comply with the Abortion Act: in par-
ticular, given that this latter statute applies only when a preg-
nancy is ‘terminated’, can it render lawful a procedure carried
out where a pregnancy has not been diagnosed?13 The answer
remains uncertain in the absence of a court decision.13
New drug-based regimens that would operate very early in
pregnancy raise similar issues. For example, researchers have
raised the possibility of developing treatments that a woman
might potentially use on a planned schedule only once in each
menstrual cycle, no matter how many prior coital acts she had
had over that period.1 14 Such drugs might potentially act either
before or after implantation. A further possibility might be to
limit the use of drugs to, on average, a few times a year, when a
woman’s menstrual period was late.1 Such drugs would be
effective for a longer period following intercourse than emer-
gency contraceptives that work only if taken before ovulation,
and therefore they could potentially serve more women and
provide more benefit at the population level.1 15
While such regimens would not be chosen by all women, they
would extend the range of current fertility control methods in
ways that might be attractive and beneficial for some. First, post-
fertilisation methods eliminate the conceptual and logistical
challenge of needing to obtain and initiate contraception before
having sex, which can be daunting.1 Second, the latter regime
(where a woman would wait for a missed period before taking
the drug) would mean that she would be less likely to take
medication unnecessarily: while the reason for taking the
morning-after pill is the actual fact of unprotected sex, here, a
missed period means a greater likelihood that a pregnancy
exists.1 Third, the development of such techniques might also
offer considerable advantages in terms of convenience for
women, if it were shown to be safe for the drugs to be obtained
in advance and kept in the bathroom cabinet to be used if neces-
sary. Such ready access to early treatment might potentially
decrease the need for later abortions. Fourth, the regimens
might be more acceptable to the many people who hold the
view that termination is preferable where it occurs earlier in
pregnancy. Fifth, some women view drug-based regimens, par-
ticularly when used at home, as more natural or more compat-
ible with their religious or ethical views than clinic-based
surgical procedures.1 16 Finally, though perhaps more controver-
sially, where used without a prior pregnancy test, these treat-
ments would allow the woman to become definitely not
pregnant, without ever needing to confront as a certain fact that
she had acted intentionally to end a known pregnancy. While
this raises issues that I have no space here to explore, this blur-
ring of the received boundary between contraception and abor-
tion might be seen as an advantage that would render the
technology attractive to some in a context where abortion is a
far more stigmatised treatment.
Clearly, even if their safety and efficacy were to be established,
these treatments would not be ideal for all women, in all
instances. The regimens described above each have disadvan-
tages compared with some other methods of fertility control.
For example, they do not offer the protection from sexually
transmitted diseases provided by barrier methods and they do
nothing to challenge the embarrassment that results in the non-
usage of such forms of contraceptive. Further, the fact that they
would operate only early in pregnancy necessarily limits the
number of cases in which they might be useful. Moreover, their
development would need to overcome significant clinical obsta-
cles. Raymond et al note:
Technically, development of a pharmaceutical regimen that reli-
ably disrupts the pregnancy process after fertilisation, either
before or after implantation or both, might be challenging.
Progesterone receptor modulators such as mifepristone, given in
adequate doses at certain times in the menstrual cycle, can inhibit
endometrial implantation of a blastocyst. Mifepristone, particu-
larly in combination with a prostaglandin, does have the well-
established ability to terminate pregnancy when administered
after implantation. However, its efficacy very early in gestation is
unclear.1
Before such treatments might be made available, further
research and robust clinical trials would be necessary to demon-
strate their safety and efficacy in the various kinds of regimens
discussed above. However, the advantages described above
render these regimens worthy of such further investigation.iMunby J has since joined the Court of Appeal.
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Yet, it seems unlikely that these treatments could be easily
trialled or, if demonstrated to be safe and effective, made widely
available for use in England. In each of the regimens noted
above, the drugs are administered or provided with a clear
intention to disrupt any pregnancy and, where they potentially
operate after implantation, the elements of a criminal offence
under the Offences Against the Person Act may be met. Further,
as for menstrual regulation, in those cases where no positive test
has established the existence of a pregnancy, it is unclear
whether offering the drugs within the framework laid down in
the Abortion Act might render their use lawful: as noted above,
the Act offers protection in those cases where a pregnancy is
‘terminated’.13 Moreover, even if the Act’s protection does
extend to cases where a pregnancy is suspected but not proved,
this would impose an extremely onerous regulatory framework
for techniques that operate so early in pregnancy and one liable
to undermine many of the advantages that they offer. Notably,
the drugs could only be used following the authorisation of two
medical practitioners, who had each taken a good faith view
that the continuation of a given pregnancy (should one exist)
would pose a greater risk to the woman’s physical or mental
health than would ending or preventing it; the administration of
the drugs would need to be supervised by a doctor; and the
drugs would need to be taken on the National Health Service or
other approved premises.10 The convenience and simplicity of a
regimen where women could have drugs in their bathroom
cabinet, ready to be used when necessary, would be lost.
It might be suggested, of course, that this is all for the good:
that terminating even a very early pregnancy should be treated
as a morally serious matter and one that is rightly subject to
strict control. After all, even if it can be convincingly established
that such control is not needed for reasons of patient safety, it
may nonetheless be justified through reference to the 1861 Act’s
purpose of preventing or condemning the intentional destruc-
tion of fetal life. Opinion on the broad, ongoing merits of this
purpose in this context and, specifically, whether such onerous
restrictions are justified so early in pregnancy will undoubtedly
be divided. However, what might be agreed upon is that an
issue of this significance to women’s reproductive health should
be decided on the basis of democratic debate, informed by
current medical understandings of reproductive biology, careful
reflection on the moral significance of implantation in the
process of embryonic and fetal development and consideration
of the regulatory implications of the ease with which drugs
available in one country yet prohibited in another can now be
obtained through online purchase.
No such informed consideration has preceded the adoption
of implantation as the appropriate moral marker between the
very different regulatory frameworks governing access to contra-
ception and abortion. The abortion provisions of the 1861 Act
were subject to no debate either within or outside of Parliament
and, given the available medical technologies and more rudi-
mentary understandings of reproductive biology in Victorian
Britain, we can be confident that distinguishing between abor-
tion and contraception was not in the minds of the architects of
the 1861 Act.17 Moreover, the search for a good contemporary
reason for according implantation such profound significance is
equally elusive. I have been unable to find any survey canvassing
public opinion on where the dividing line should fall between
contraception and abortion, what factors should be relevant to
this decision and what regulatory implications this should have.
While the absence of such empirical data renders such a claim
inevitably speculative, it seems at least possible that the contra-
gestive regimens described above—tablets taken within weeks of
intercourse, perhaps without a pregnancy ever being confirmed,
at a stage when a large proportion of pregnancies will be natur-
ally lost—might, for many, intuitively appear more appropriately
regulated in the same way as contraceptives, with restrictions on
access dictated only by concerns for patient safety.
Similarly, it should be noted that the philosophical literature
dealing with abortion offers little support for the view that
implantation is an important moral marker. While a voluminous
literature offers careful, detailed, although greatly conflicting,
justifications for the ethical significance of various points in
embryonic and fetal development (including fertilisation, the
emergence of the primitive streak, the acquisition of various
cognitive abilities, the achievement of the capacity for independ-
ent life, birth, and so on),18–20 I have failed to find a single
philosophical account that argues for the moral significance of
implantation. Theological justifications are similarly elusive.
Two broader arguments in support of the significance of
implantation should be noted, although each is ultimately
unconvincing. First, it might be suggested that while implant-
ation does not enjoy any particular ethical significance in its
own right, it nonetheless offers a practically useful, conveniently
timed marker for a necessary gear change between the appropri-
ate regulation of contraception and abortion. This argument
may well have had some force in a historical context where
there was relatively clear water between known methods of dis-
rupting a pregnancy that operate in a matter of days after inter-
course, on the one hand, and techniques that are effective in
interrupting an established pregnancy only after an interval of a
significant number of weeks, on the other. For sure, menstrual
regulation served to muddy this water; however, this technique
never offered the potential advantages that come with the drug-
based contragestive regimens described above and, as such, the
fact that its use was legally blocked did not represent too serious
a loss to the range of methods of fertility control available to
English women. The contragestive techniques described above,
however, operate precisely to remove the clear water between
contraception and abortion and, given the potential advantages
that they offer, existing legal hurdles to their development and
use offer a serious challenge to any assumed ‘convenience’ of
drawing a distinction on the basis of implantation.
Second, those who believe that the moral significance of the
human conceptus lies in its potential to become a full
human person might argue that implantation is important in
representing a point of increased probability that a pregnancy
will succeed, with one study finding that 22% of pregnancies
are lost before the stage at which they might be clinically
detected.21 But even accepting for the sake of argument that the
point of transition between the very different regulatory frame-
works described above is appropriately grounded in a calcula-
tion of the likelihood of a pregnancy succeeding to term (in
itself, a controversial claim), this does not resolve the issue of
where the boundary thus justified is best located. The same
study found that 31% of pregnancies were lost after implant-
ation,21 and 12 weeks is typically taken to be the point when a
pregnancy is sufficiently certain for it to be ‘safe’ to communi-
cate it to family and friends. The important point, again, is that
any decision of whether and how such probabilities matter eth-
ically should be the product of a modern, democratic debate,
informed by current medical science.
CONCLUSION
The regulatory cliff edge between ‘contraception’ and ‘abortion’
in English law results not from careful consideration but from
historical accident. It has emerged as contraceptive use and
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availability has developed in line with evolving popular morality,
with the language of the 1861 Act proving sufficiently flexible
to accommodate the lawful use of modern contraceptive tech-
nologies.9 While attitudes to abortion, particularly in the early
stages of gestation, have similarly become far more liberal since
1861, the limits to the elasticity of statutory language prevents
any similar evolution that might allow for the regulation of
early contragestive techniques to be governed merely by con-
cerns for patient safety.
It is now over four decades since one commentator wrote of
the 1861 Act:
The situation is that a law which even on its own proper ground
was already antiquated is now being asked to bear an impossible
yet increasing strain … Of course there must be a thorough over-
haul of the crime of abortion, in all its aspects, before long.22
This call for reform has been frustrated by the reluctance of
successive governments to address the issue of abortion, which
in itself may reflect the dominance of vocal minorities in the
public debate. Most recently, abortion law has been excluded
from the Law Commission’s otherwise wide-ranging consult-
ation on the operation of the 1861 Act, a statute that it rightly
recognises to be archaic, inconsistent and deeply flawed.23 The
resulting legal stagnation leaves us with a criminal law frame-
work for the voluntary interruption of pregnancy that is
grounded in the moral mores and medical practices of earlier
times. Moreover, while many countries treat ‘implantation’ as
offering an important moral and legal boundary, this results in a
regulatory cliff edge that is particularly sheer in English law,
given the onerous criminal penalties contained in the 1861 Act
and the tight medical control that the 1967 Act foresees for
abortion to be deemed lawful. That archaic legislation, which
has remained largely unconsidered for one and a half centuries,
is drafted so as to block the development and use of safe, effect-
ive forms of fertility control that operate so soon after inter-
course provides a compelling argument for a fundamental
review of, at least, this aspect of its operation. Further, within
any such review, given the reproductive health arguments in
favour of facilitating access to safe, effective technologies that
operate at early gestational ages, it seems reasonable to suggest
that the onus should be on those who support the use of crim-
inal sanction to provide good arguments to justify the deploy-
ment of this most punitive of state powers in this context and,
specifically, to explain why it offers an appropriate response at
such an early stage of pregnancy.24 25
The fact that life exists as a seamless continuum means that
the attempt to identify markers that allow us to make moral and
legal distinctions between different stages of biological develop-
ment is a fraught enterprise, with any purported bright lines
liable to be criticised as misplaced or arbitrary. It does not
follow, of course, that law can operate without such lines: we
need to be able to determine when someone acquires the full
human rights that accompany legal personhood and to distin-
guish between a living person and a dead body. While such lines
will be inevitably (and appropriately) subject to contestation, it
is important to ensure that the process by which they are drawn
is capable of robust defence: that they are grounded in careful
consideration, informed by clear moral reasoning and a solid
medical evidence base. The modest claim defended in this paper
is that the current basis for distinguishing between contraception
and abortion falls woefully short of meeting this test. Rather, it
is determined by a statutory phrase that is a product of a world,
which ‘in matters sexual was almost unimaginably different
from ours’ (para 332),11 having been passed by a Victorian
Parliament within which women had no voice.ii This is an
indefensible basis for the regulation of health services that
matter so intimately to modern women.
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